December

Belgium - Bird flu detected in Belgian farms
24 Dec 2008
Xinhua [edited] [Promed]
It is reported that emergency measures have been taken after an outbreak of bird flu was detected in 2 farms in northern Belgium, Belgian media reported on Tuesday [23 Dec 2008]. According to this story, control tests showed last Friday [19 Dec 2008] that some ducks and geese in a farm in Bocholt, which borders the Netherlands, were infected with the H5 bird flu virus. The same virus was also detected in a farm in Buggenhout in the province of East Flanders. The Belgian Federal Food Agency, which supervises the safety of the food chain, has ordered emergency measures to be taken in the 2 farms and surrounding areas. Some 5000 animals had to be slaughtered as a precautionary measure and all poultry within a radius of one kilometer of the farms must be kept indoors.

Denmark - Bird flu suspected
23 Dec 2008
Reuters via The Strait Times [edited] [Promed]
It is reported that a flock of free-range chickens on a farm in south-western Denmark is suspected of being infected with bird flu. The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration has isolated the flock pending further tests.

Germany - Avian influenza spreading in Cloppenburg [District]
13 Dec 2008
Paz-online [in German, trans. submitter SZ, edited] [Promed]
It is reported that avian influenza is spreading in the [district] of Cloppenburg. An influenza virus that poses no danger for humans has been detected in 4 additional holdings in Garrel and Boesel. Affected are a total of 58,000 turkeys, which will be culled immediately.This information was made available by the district authorities on Saturday [13 Dec 2008]. During the last couple of days a total of 43,000 turkeys have been culled and destroyed. According to the veterinary authorities the virus is spreading fast. According to this story, low pathogenic H5N2 influenza virus was detected on turkey fattening units. It is a mild form of bird flu, a disease sometimes called fowl plague and not the dangerous, highly aggressive virus H5N1, which is also known to affect people. The story goes on by explaining that the new outbreaks in the [district] are, according to the district administration, on 2 farms in the exclusion zone set up around Garrel, on a farm near the exclusion zone and a fattening unit in Boesel, about 12 km (7.5 mi) away from the current disease zones.Around Garrel, the exclusion zone was extended and in Boesel a new exclusion zone was set up. By extending the restricted areas, a further 14 farms are officially investigated. The Agriculture Ministry of Lower Saxony had ordered to keep all poultry confined. This applies to all owners of chicken, ducks, geese, and poultry, commercial and private.The Agriculture Minister (CDU) called for permission of vaccination to contain the disease.
Related stories
Germany - A wider restricted zone set up in Friesoythe
Press release, Cloppenburg County official Web site [Trans. from German, edited][Promed]
The number of poultry holdings [in the Cloppenburg County] infected by the low-pathogenic avian influenza virus [H5N3] has risen to 20, as of Sat [20 Dec 2008] afternoon. Two suspected cases of the last few days have, according to County Cloppenburg, been confirmed by the official investigation. This relates to a holding in Friesoythe-Schwaneburg, where 10,800 turkeys had already been precautionarily culled at the beginning of the week, as well as a suspected outbreak reported on Thursday [18 Dec 2008] from the municipality of Garrel where nearly 15,000 turkeys have been killed. Since the outbreak in Friesoythe-Schwaneburg has now been officially confirmed, a 1000 meters [1093 yards] radius zone has been declared as an exclusion zone around the farm. No additional poultry farms are located within the said zone, leading to a limited impact of the declaration. A new suspected case was reported on Saturday [20 Dec 2008] from the municipality Bosel, where 17,500 turkeys have been killed as a precaution, according to the district. The official investigation's result is not yet available. So far, approximately 300,000 birds have been culled and destroyed.

October

Germany - Farm duck positive for H5N1 bird flu
9 Oct 2008
PR Inside.com, Associated Press (AP) report [edited] [Promed] According to this story, authorities say a duck at a farm in eastern Germany has tested positive for the H5N1 strain of the bird flu virus. The social affairs ministry in the eastern state of Saxony says the farm near Goerlitz on the Polish border has been sealed off. The ministry said Thursday [9 Oct 2008] that the farm has more than 1000 birds, including turkeys and geese. Germany has seen several cases of bird flu in the past, most recently in December [2007]. The disease has ravaged poultry stocks in Asia, and scientists believe it spread to both Europe and Africa with migratory wild birds. Though bird flu is difficult for people to catch, the H5N1 strain has killed at least 206 people worldwide.
Related stories
9 Oct 2008 – Bird flu returns to Germany
Deutsche Welle [edited] [Promed]
Germany's national animal health laboratory on the Baltic island of Riems said the find was "somewhat surprising" as the infection alert had been reduced to moderate after an outbreak was beaten last December [2007]. It is also reported that officials launched the largest-ever bird cull in Germany, exterminating a massive 160 000 geese over a weekend in Wachenroth, Bavaria.
10 Oct 2008 – Germany confirms 1st bird flu case this year
Reuters via The Guardian [edited][Promed]
17 Oct 2008 - Low pathogenic avian influenza (poultry)
OIE's WAHID interface [edited] [Promed]
Summary
Report type : Immediate notification
Start date : 02 Oct 2008
Date of first confirmation of the event: 09 Oct 2008
Reason for notification: 1st occurrence of a listed disease
Causal agent: Low pathogenic avian influenza virus
Serotype : H5N3
Nature of diagnosis : Laboratory (advanced)
This event pertains to a defined zone within the country
New outbreaks
Outbreak 1 (14365A080001) Zoo Leipzig, Leipzig, Stadt, SACHSEN
Date of start of the outbreak: 02 Oct 2008
Outbreak status: Continuing (or date resolved not provided)
Epidemiological unit: Not applicable
Affected animals
Species/ Susceptible/ Cases/ Deaths/ Destroyed/ Slaughtered
Birds/ 248/ 4/ 0/ 4/ 0
Affected population: 1 goose and 3 ducks affected in a zoo.
Outbreak 2 (14365A080002) Leipzig - Stadtgut Molkau, Leipzig, SACHSEN
Date of start of the outbreak: 09 Oct 2008
Outbreak status: Continuing (or date resolved not provided)
Epidemiological unit: Farm
Affected animals
Species/ Susceptible/ Cases/ Deaths/ Destroyed/ Slaughtered
Birds/ 106/ 106/ 0/ 106/ 0
Affected population: A holding with no trading activity concerning
live poultry. The neuraminidase has not yet been identified.
Summary of outbreaks
Total outbreaks : 2
Total animals affected
Species/ Susceptible/ Cases/ Deaths/ Destroyed/ Slaughtered
Birds/ 354/ 110/ 0/ 110/ 0
Epidemiology
Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection: Unknown or inconclusive
Epidemiological comments : Vaccination is forbidden for poultry, it is
only allowed for zoo birds.
Control measures
Measures applied
- Control of wildlife reservoirs
- Movement control inside the country
- Screening
- Zoning
- Disinfection of infected premises/establishment(s)
- Modified stamping out
- Vaccination prohibited
- No treatment of affected animals
Measures to be applied : No other measures
Future Reporting
The event is continuing. Weekly follow-up reports will be submitted.
18 Oct 2008 - EU, DG Health and Consumers Website - SCFCAH
meetings/presentations [edited] [Promed]

July

United Kingdom - Origin of the Feb 2007 outbreak in turkeys
28 Jul 2008
Financial Times [edited] [Promed]
According to this story, Bernard Matthews Foods is to stop selling turkeys raised outside the UK, a move designed to address concerns that its outbreak of bird flu two years ago may have been caused by infected birds imported from sub-contractors in Hungary.

June

United Kingdom - H5N1 avian flu: call for wild bird early warning system
6 Jun 2008
Farmers Weekly Interactive [edited] [Promed]
Bernard Matthews Foods has urged the UK government and poultry industry to work together in establishing an early warning system for migratory birds that may carry H5N1 avian flu.

European Union- Animal health and welfare aspects of avian influenza and the risk of its introduction into the EU poultry holdings: summary
5 Jun 2008
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Scientific Opinions,
Question No EFSA-Q-2007-179, adopted 7 May 2008 [edited] [Promed]
Scientific opinion of the Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW)
Following a request from the Commission, the AHAW panel was asked to deliver a scientific opinion on the animal health and welfare aspects of avian influenza and the risk of its introduction into the EU poultry holdings.
The Commission asked to update, consolidate, and summarise the main conclusions and recommendations from previous EFSA opinions influenza (2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a and 2007b) in the light of new scientific evidence available. The AHAW panel was asked to provide scientific advice and assess risk factors for the introduction and spread of avian influenza as defined in Council Directive 2005/94/EC into poultry holdings in the EU, to support a possible fine-tuning of current prevention and biosecurity measures taken by the Member States.
New findings on AIV [avian influenza virus] characteristics
Phylogenetic analyses of strains from EU Member States indicated that all H5N1 viruses detected in the EU in poultry and wild birds since 2006 were closely related and belong to clades 2.2 and 2.3. The use of phylogeny can advise on the source of infection, but it is not possible in all circumstances to be definitive about the likely source of an introduction.
Pathogenesis and transmission
Concerning the pathogenesis and the transmission of AIV, the main conclusions were that although fecal-oral infection chains govern the transmission of AIV, accumulating evidence indicates that H5N1 virus may be excreted at higher concentrations from the respiratory tract of birds as compared to LPAI [low pathogenic avian influenza] viruses. This has important consequences for sampling methodologies to detect HPAI [highly pathogenic avian influenza] H5N1. Although there is no evidence for aerosol transmission of H5N1 virus, this transmission route cannot be excluded within short distances.
Many, if not all, poultry species are susceptible to infection by AI viruses of the different subtypes, but only H5 and H7 subtypes are able to induce HPAI. H5N1 of the Asian lineage remains able to cause significant mortality in wild bird populations, although experimental studies show that some species can become infected without clinical manifestations, shedding virus whilst apparently healthy. Indirect evidence also points to some mild clinical effects of LPAIV in wild bird species.
Several domestic animals, including pigs, cats, and dogs are susceptible to H5N1 HPAI viruses under natural and experimental conditions. H5N1 failed to spread between mammal species, which makes the chance for virus transmission to humans extremely low. For cats, though, it has been suggested that spread between cats and from cats to poultry may occur. It remains to be examined whether the viral genetic changes that are required for adaptation of AI viruses to pigs or other mammals occur more readily in some animal species than in others.
Diagnosis
Viral isolation in embryonated eggs still remains the "gold standard" for AI virus detection. Although it is slower, its diagnostic sensitivity is often superior or equal to many rapid tests.
Virus genome detection by RT-PCR [reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction], which can be designed to detect all avian influenza A viruses or specific subtypes, provides a rapid, sensitive, and convenient alternative for virus isolation. Any of the influenza A commercial rapid tests can detect the influenza viruses, but it should be emphasized that their specificity and sensitivity are limited for their application.
The currently available serological tests are not all able to distinguish between sublineages or HP and LP strains. Furthermore, positive serological findings give no indication of current infection status. Competition tests are polyvalent and may be of use for obtaining broad estimate of infection levels in wild bird populations.
Epidemiology and surveillance
Enhanced surveillance both in poultry and wild birds in the EU during 2006 to 2008 proved effective for the early detection of H5N1 HPAI. Passive surveillance proved to be important for the detection of H5N1 HPAI infections in wild birds. In contrast active surveillance proved a better surveillance source to detect LPAI infections. Active surveillance remains an important source of epidemiological information of H5N1, especially around sites with active outbreaks. Due to the heterogeneity of the survey in the EU, the mobility of wild birds, and the relatively small sample sizes compared to the overall population of wild birds in the EU, the surveillance results can not be used to estimate the true prevalence of AIV subtypes or their geographical distribution within the EU.
Current knowledge on EU outbreaks does not allow prediction of a risk season for H5N1 HPAI outbreak occurrence in the EU. Fewer H7 positive holdings than H5 and fewer duck and geese holdings positive for H7 than for H5 were found during the 2006-2007 survey. However due to the small sample sizes and the design of the surveillance strategy with varying degrees of targeting to risk factors, it is not possible to precisely estimate the actual prevalence of avian influenza of H5 and H7 subtypes in holdings of domestic poultry.
Intervention strategies
Biosecurity measures constitute important barriers to introduction of AIV into poultry holdings. Culling and safe disposal of poultry from infected holdings (as defined by 2005/94/EC) is one of the most effective measures limiting spread of virus. Pre-emptive culling of healthy poultry on holdings where AI is not thought to be present may be necessary to limit AIV spread in order to remove susceptible birds from the immediate vicinity.
Potent subtype-restricted and safe AIV vaccines are available for use in poultry. Quality-controlled production and licensing procedures are essential to ensure vaccine efficacy. Vaccination induces protection against HPAIV induced clinical signs; it raises the barrier against infection with HPAIV field virus and reduces field virus excretion by amplitude and duration.
The risk of "silent spread" of AIV in vaccinated poultry populations requires stringent supervision and control of vaccination, including the application of DIVA [Differentiating between Infected and Vaccinated Animals] strategies campaigns. Decisions on the use of vaccination depend on economical and structural aspects of the poultry sector and on epidemiological factors concerning risks of virus introduction and spread.
Exit strategies from vaccination campaigns should be clearly defined before such campaigns commence and unrestricted use of AIV vaccines in poultry may give rise to an accelerated antigenic drift of field virus targets. In turn constant updates of vaccine virus strains may be required.
Risk of introduction of avian influenza by wild birds
Wild birds have been implicated in the geographical expansion of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus outbreaks across Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. This should be considered in addition to traditional transmission by infected poultry, contaminated equipment, and people. Such a role requires excretion of virus in the absence of debilitating disease.
Since the last EFSA opinion on the role of migratory birds for the spread of HPAI relatively few (21) wild bird species have been the subject of experimental infection, however, more birds than previously thought might be involved in the spread of avian influenza through shedding either in pre-symptomatic infection or in asymptomatic infection.
Given the number of cases of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds observed over the last 2 years, the risk of introduction and release of HPAI by wild birds appears to be a regular, rather than a very rare or very frequent event and the constant presence of H5N1 in the wild bird population since 2006 cannot be excluded.
However, it is still unclear to what extent wild bird species, from which HPAI has been isolated, act as vectors rather than serving as indicators of transmission by becoming infected by other vector species. H5N1 virus may be circulating at an undetectable level in wild bird populations across Europe.
There is a continuing risk of introduction of AI into poultry populations from infected wild birds that may come into contact directly or indirectly with domestic poultry. Pathogenic amplification of avian influenza in domestic birds and subsequent spill-back to wild birds may complement the synergistic mechanism existing between domestic poultry and wild bird species responsible for the intercontinental spread of H5N1.
Risks of AI introduction by the importation of live birds and avian products from 3rd countries
Infected live poultry are potential agents for introduction of AI especially when they are in their incubation period of HPAI, infected with LPAI, or of a species that does not show overt clinical signs (such as seems to be the case for some duck species). Day old chicks and hatching eggs are not regarded as a big risk although HPAI infections can not be entirely excluded.
Pigeons have previously been thought to be relatively resistant to infection by the virus and therefore regarded as a low risk in the spread of HPAI H5N1. However, some recent experimental studies have shown that they are susceptible to infection. It can not be excluded that pigeons act as mechanical carrier of virus. The sport pigeon racing over large distances -- from country to country -- plus the procedure of gathering them together for release represents introduction risks that are unique to these birds.
Wild captured birds pose a risk of introduction of HPAI. Import and quarantine provisions for captive birds have been revised and strengthened and are now restricted to birds bred in captivity from approved breeding establishments from a limited list of countries. Therefore only illegal importations would pose a risk.
Importation of fresh meat has the highest risk of introducing of avian influenza with emphasis on duck meat due to the fact that the disease might not have been apparent before slaughter.
Eggs for consumption may be infected with avian influenza; however they do not often come into contact with poultry again. Contaminated packaging materials and trays pose a far greater risk. Egg or meat products are usually subjected to a form of heat treatment, which would inactivate the virus. Semen may be infected after viremia of the donor and a potential source of infection for HPAI.
Veterinary checks on EU borders
The check points at the EU borders have been improved over the last years but there are still many deficiencies. The TRACES [TRAde Control and Expert System] system is also not fully implemented and therefore does not give the real time data of movements of live animals. Its active implementation across the EU is a high priority.
Welfare aspects of avian influenza
New developments of the welfare issues associated with avian influenza were discussed, that is, on the killing of poultry for disease control including the use of dry or high extension rate foams delivering gases that kill by hypoxia. Other developments are mobile on-farm slaughter plants and whole house gassing techniques involving different gas mixtures, and also high-throughput electrocution techniques.
Recent studies show that, where birds are handled by people during emergency killing, handling often causes much stress and injury. Portable shackling lines for electrical stunning and killing, using presently available equipment can fail in that birds are not killed but only stunned.
The gassing of birds in buildings can kill poultry humanely provided that the building is reasonably sealed to exclude air entry, there is no functioning ventilation system, the gas jet does not directly contact birds, the gas is not cold enough to harm body tissue, and the gas is an inert gas like argon or nitrogen or a gas mixture with no more than 30 per cent carbon dioxide.
Recent work on carbon monoxide suggests that in addition to being dangerous for humans, it may cause poor welfare in poultry.
Foams with a low gas to water extension ratio (100-140), such as high density fire fighting foam, kill by drowning (asphyxiation and hypoxia) and will often, or perhaps always, result in poor welfare in the birds. Foams with a high gas to water extension ratio (300 or more) surround the mouth of the birds with the gas so, if an inert gas such as nitrogen is used, the birds are stunned humanely and then killed by the gas.
Ducks and geese are rendered unconscious and killed by gases such as CO2 more slowly than chickens or turkeys so that exposure to CO2 gas leads to poor welfare for a longer time.
Impact of avian influenza on biodiversity
HPAI H5N1 continues to have significant implications for the conservation of several species of globally threatened waterbirds and may threaten the survival of endangered felids.
From the little information available there is no indication about a direct threat of HPAI of poultry genetic diversity, except for localized genetics. There may be an indirect impact of the HPAI related measures including restocking and sector restructuring.

United Kingdom – Avian influenza H7 confirmed in Oxfordshire
3 Jun 2008
DEFRA News Release Ref: 171/08 [edited] [Promed]
The Chief Veterinary Officer, Nigel Gibbens, has today confirmed avian influenza in chickens on premises near Banbury in Oxfordshire after preliminary tests were positive for the H7 strain. All birds on the premises will be slaughtered as a precautionary measure.
Laboratory testing continues and results which will allow confirmation of whether the strain is high or low pathogenicity will follow. A detailed epidemiological investigation to better understand the origin and development of the disease is underway.
A Temporary Control Zone with a 3km [1.86-mile] inner zone and a 10km [6.2-mile] outer zone is being established around the Infected Premises.
Related stories
4 Jun 2008 – Avian Influenza, H7, HPAI
Defra press release Ref: 174/08 [edited] [Promed]
Following further laboratory results, the Chief Veterinary Officer has confirmed that the strain of H7 avian influenza present in laying hens at the farm in Banbury is highly pathogenic. Further laboratory tests are in progress to identify the N type and possible relationships with previously identified viruses. A detailed epidemiological investigation to better understand the origin and development of the disease is also underway.
4 Jun 2008 – Avian Influenza outbreak in Oxfordshire: Protection and Surveillance Zones declared
Defra information bulletin Ref: 175/08 [edited] [Promed]
The Chief Veterinary Officer has confirmed that the restrictions established on 3 Jun 2008 to contain the outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza at a farm in Banbury, Oxfordshire should remain in place. Protection and Surveillance Zones now replace the Temporary Control Zone. This follows urgent consideration of the measures required to control the outbreak at this stage. The European Commission has been informed of this development.
5 Jun 2008 - OIE WAHID (World Animal Health Information Database), weekly disease information 2008; 21(23) [edited] [Promed]
Report type : immediate notification
Start date : 22 May 2008
Date of first confirmation of the event : 4 Jun 2008
Reason for notification : new strain of a listed disease
Causal agent: highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, serotype H7N7
Nature of diagnosis : laboratory (advanced)
This event pertains to the whole country
New outbreaks
*Total outbreaks : 1
Outbreak location : Shenington, Oxfordshire, England
Date of start of the outbreak: 22 May 2008
Outbreak status : continuing (or date resolved not provided)
Epidemiological unit : farm
Affected animals
Species : birds
Susceptible : 25 000
Cases : 15 000
Deaths : 10 000
Destroyed: 15 000
Slaughtered : --
Affected population : laying flock of Gallus gallus [chickens].
Epidemiology
Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection : unknown or inconclusive.
Epidemiological comments : first noted 2 weeks ago with mild clinical disease. Marked clinical disease in 2 sheds was then observed on 31 May 2008. Epidemiological investigation is in progress.
17 Jun 2008 - Bird flu outbreak was restricted
BBC NEWS [edited] [Promed]
An outbreak of bird flu in Oxfordshire was confined to a single premise, a Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) report has concluded. According to this story, more than 25 000 chickens were culled after birds tested positive for the H7 strain of the disease on Eastwood Farm, near Banbury on 3 Jun 2008. DEFRA's epidemiology report, published on Tuesday [17 Jun 2008] says there was no evidence of infection in the protection zone. However, investigations continue and the source is still being examined. The report suggests the possiblity that the highly pathogenic H7N7 avian influenza came from a low pathogenic strain already present on the farm. The 3km (1.8-mile) protection and 10km (6.2-mile) surveillance zones remain in place. Further surveillance, testing and epidemiological work on the outbreak are continuing.
17 Jun 2008 - Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H7N7, Oxfordshire, June 2008 Executive summary
(11 Jun 2008, updated 16 Jun 2008): HPAI H7N7 DEFRA Epidemiology Report [edited] [Promed]
11 Jul 2008 - Final epidemiology report published
Defra (UK Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs) Information Bulletin, ref 222/08 [edited] [Promed]
Defra has today [11 Jul 2008] published a final epidemiology report into the avian influenza outbreak confirmed in Oxfordshire on 4 Jun [2008]. The report concludes that at the time of writing (2 Jul 2008) infection was confined to a single premise, and there is no evidence of infection on any contact or geographically close premises, or evidence of spread of infection to any other premises to date. While it has not been possible to conclusively identify the source of the infection, the 2 most likely sources of the outbreak are thought to be: unidentified avian influenza in domestic premises in Great Britain, associated either by proximity or potential contact, or avian influenza in wildlife in contact with the infected premise. Investigations are now complete. The Deputy chief veterinary officer said: "This incident has demonstrated again the potential for avian influenza to be introduced into domestic poultry in the UK. The risk of further incidents, while low, remains. I urge poultry keepers to maintain the highest standards of biosecurity and to report suspicion of disease promptly including where records indicate increased mortality or reduced performance."

April

Denmark – Norway - LPAI H7 Bird flu knocking at Norway's door
29 Apr 2008
Afteposten [edited]
According to this story, 2000 chickens and ducks had to be slaughtered in Fyn in Denmark on Tuesday [29 Apr 2008] after a routine test uncovered a strain of bird influenza, putting Norwegians on high alert. This is the 1st time in 2 years that the bird flu has been found in Denmark and the agricultural authorities have put an export ban in place for the time being.
Related stories
29 Apr 2008 - Bird flu virus detected in Denmark
Xinhua
29 Apr 2008 - Denmark: LPAI H7
OIE WAHID (World Animal Health Information Database) weekly disease information 2008; 21(18) [edited]
Summary
Report type: immediate notification
Start date : 24 Apr 2008
Date of 1st confirmation of event: 28 Apr 2008
Report date : 29 April 2008
Reason for notification : reoccurrence of a listed disease
Date of previous occurrence : 19 Jul 2006
Causal agent: low pathogenic avian influenza virus (serotype H7)
Serotype : pending
Nature of diagnosis : laboratory (advanced)
This event pertains to the whole country
Outbreak 1 Stenstrup, Svendborg Kommune, South
Date of start of the outbreak: 24 Apr 2008
Outbreak status : continuing (or date resolved not provided)
Epidemiological unit: farm
Affected animals
Species : birds
Susceptibl e: 2050
Deaths : 0
Destroyed: 2050
Slaughtered : 0
Affected population: a poultry farm with 300 geese, 250 ducks, and 1500 mallards.
Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.
Epidemiological comments: geese and ducks were tested in accordance with the Danish surveillance programme for avian influenza in poultry. The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration has set up a restricted zone around the holding and is implementing the necessary measures in accordance with the European Union Directive 2005/94/EC.

Russia – Ministry confirms bird flu outbreak in Far East region of Primorye
12 Apr 2008
India Times [edited]
Russia's agriculture ministry confirmed a bird flu outbreak in a village in the Far East region of Primorye which was quarantined after scores of chickens died. "In 2 days, 28 out of 42 hens and guinea fowl died on a farm" in the village of Vozdvizhenka, 110 km [68.3 miles] north of Vladivostok, the ministry's veterinary control unit said in a statement on Thursday [10 Apr 2008]. The dead birds had been incinerated, it added. A regional laboratory made the discovery after testing samples taken from sick birds, and a national laboratory was due to determine if it was the deadly H5N1 strain of the virus. Authorities cordoned off the village, killed all other fowl on the farm and vaccinated birds in the village and nearby areas, the ministry said..

March

Switzerland – Avian Influenza
27 Mar 2008
IOL (Independent Online, South Africa) [edited]
Switzerland on Thursday [27 Mar 2008] reported its 1st case of bird flu in 2 years, after diagnosing a wild duck with the H5N1 virus, said the Swiss federal veterinary department. The virus was detected in a wild duck on Lake Sempach, near Lucerne, during a regular detection programme in which 200 specimens obtained from birds were tested.
The duck shows no symptoms of the disease, said the office, adding that the detected virus is almost identical with those detected in Europe in 2007.
The risk of transmission to farmed poultry is small, indicated the office. This case brings the total number of H5N1 cases detected in Switzerland to thirty-three. Related sources
2 Apr 2008 - Switzerland - Highly pathogenic avian influenza
OIE WAHID Disease Information 2008; 21(14) [edited]
Start date: 22 Feb 2008
Date event resolved: 1 Apr 2008
Reason for notification: reoccurrence of a listed disease
Date of previous occurrence: June 2006
Causal agent: highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
Serotype: H5N1
Nature of diagnosis: Laboratory (advanced)
This event pertains to the whole
Outbreak location and affected population
Luzern (Oberkirch, Oberkirch): 2 tufted ducks ( Aythya fuligula ), one common pochard ( Aythya ferina ), one mallard ( Anas platyrhynchos ) and 2 great cormorants ( Phalacrocorax carbo ) that were caught in a bird fyke [net held open with hoops. - Mod.Promed] on Lake Sempach.
These birds were sampled in the frame of the national programme for HPAI and released after sampling. The common pochard ( Aythya ferina ) that tested positive showed no clinical signs of the disease at the time of sampling. The other birds tested negative. Until now, there was no indication of the presence of clinical infection in this region of Switzerland. This region can be considered as one with the highest surveillance activity for avian influenza virus in Switzerland. Since October 2007, 200 living birds have been sampled and tested negative in that region.
Species: wild species
Susceptible 6
Cases 1
Deaths 0
Destroyed 0
Slaughtered 0
Epidemiology: Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection. Unknown or inconclusive.
Epidemiological comments: there was no evidence for a suspicion of HPAI at the moment of sampling, as neither clinical signs nor an increase in morbidity or mortality could be observed in the area (neither in wild birds nor in backyard or farmed birds). Monitoring samples are typically analysed in batches, explaining why the result was obtained only recently and notified with a delay of about one month. The sequence determined (303 BP) showed high homology to the viral sequences found in Eastern Europe in 2007. The obtained sequence at the hemagglutinin A cleavage site revealed that the H5N1 strain detected was highly pathogenic, and the pathogenicity index could not be determined.
In the past 5 weeks after sampling, no increased morbidity or mortality was observed in wild or domestic birds neither in the area of Lake Sempach nor in other regions of Switzerland. Proportionately to its wild bird population, Lake Sempach is the best monitored water place in Switzerland, as it is the home base of the Swiss Ornithological Station. Nevertheless, measures were taken in line with the Swiss and European Union legislation, and disease notification to the European Committee and to the OIE was done, since the information about this isolated, random finding might be of importance to the scientific community and to policy makers

Turkey - Highly pathogenic avian influenza
18 Mar 2008
OIE WAHID Disease Information 2008; 21(12) [edited]
Start date : 9 Mar 2008
Date of 1st confirmation of the event: 17 Mar 2008
Report date : 18 Mar 2008
Reason for notification : Reoccurrence of a listed disease
Date of previous occurrence : March 2008
Causal agent : Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
Serotype H5N1
Nature of diagnosis : Laboratory (advanced)
This event pertains to a defined zone within the country
Outbreak: 1 Edirne, Esetce, Ipsala, EDIRNE
Date of start of the outbreak : 9 Mar 2008
Outbreak status : Continuing (or date resolved not provided)
Epidemiological unit : Village
Species : Birds
Susceptible : 38
Cases : 22
Deaths : 22
Destroyed : 16
Slaughtered : 0
Affected population : backyard chickens
Summary of outbreaks
Total outbreaks : 1
Proportion susceptible animals lost * 100.00 percent
* Removed from the susceptible population through death, destruction and/or slaughter
Epidemiology: Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection;
Fomites (humans, vehicles, feed, etc.)
Epidemiological comments : The disease was notified to the veterinary
services on 14 Mar 2008.
Laboratory name and type : Pendik Veterinary Control and Research
Institute (National laboratory)
Species : Birds
Test: rapid tests
Test date : 17 Mar 2008
Result : Positive
Species: Birds
Test: real-time PCR
Test date: 17 Mar 2008
Result : Positive
Related sources
19 Mar 2008 - CIDRAP News

February

United Kingdom - Bird flu discovered in dead goose
29 Feb 2008
BBC News [edited]
A dead goose has tested positive for the highly virulent H5N1 strain of bird flu, government scientists said. The remains of the bird were discovered around 1km (0.6m) from Abbotsbury Swannery in Dorset, where a number of swans have been found with the disease. The Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs said the Canada goose was the 11th wild bird in the area to test positive for H5N1. Restrictions on the movement of poultry have now been introduced in the area. Defra said the decision was based on veterinary advice. Poultry keepers will not be able to move birds from their premises except under license. Since 10 Jan 2008, H5N1 has been identified in 10 mute swans in the area -- with the last case confirmed on 4 Feb 2008.

United Kingdom - Mute swan, Weymouth city, Dorset, new outbreak
13 Feb 2008 (edited)
Defra (UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), Animal health & welfare, Disease surveillance & control [edited]
On 4 Feb 2008 Defra reported a 2nd outbreak of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza [HPAI] on the Dorset coast, UK.The new outbreak refers to a mute swan euthanised in a nature reserve (Radipole Lake) in Weymouth city and later tested positive for H5N1, according to OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health) follow-up report No. 3 (OIE Ref: 6760, report date: 6 Feb 2008, UK [available here ].This is the 10th infected swan found so far on the Dorset coast.

January

Influenza virus in Norway resistant to oseltamivir
27 Jan 2008
EpiNorth [edited]
As the Norwegian Institute of Public Health reports, influenza activity in Norway is currently at a low level but is increasing. Of 16 influenza A(H1N1) viruses examined for resistance this season, 12 are resistant against the anti-influenza drug oseltamivir (Tamiflu). The Norwegian Institute of Public Health requests Norwegian physicians treating patients with influenza to be aware of this if considering antiviral treatment. Some of these viruses are sent to the WHO influenza collaborating centre in London for resistance testing and other analyses. [The] dominating virus this season, both in Norway and the rest of Europe, is influenza A (H1N1) Solomon Islands. A total of 12 of 16 A(H1N1)-virus from different patients from various places around the country have been shown to be highly resistant to oseltamivir (Tamiflu). The virus is susceptible to other anti-influenza drugs [Relenza, amantadine, rimantadine - Mod.CP]. This event has been notified to WHO under the International Health Regulations.
Related sources
29 Jan 2008 - European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)

Turkey- Avian Influenza – Zonguldak
22 Jan 2008
OIE, WAHID (World Animal Health Information Database), Disease Information 2008; 21(4)
Highly pathogenic avian influenza, Turkey
Start date: 12 Jan 2008
Reason for notification: reoccurrence of a listed disease
Date of previous occurrence: 2 Apr 2007
Manifestation of disease: clinical disease
Causal agent: highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, serotype H5N1
Outbreak 1: Village, Sazkoy, Caycuma, Zonguldak
Outbreak status: continuing (or date resolved not provided)
Species: birds
Susceptible: 300
Cases: 13
Deaths: 13
Affected population: backyard poultry
Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection: contact with wild species
Related Sources
25 Jan 2008 - Zaman
Officials point to wild ducks as cause of bird flu in Zonguldak

Ukraine – Avian Influenza (Crimea)
22 Jan 2008
OIE, WAHID (World Animal Health Information Database), Disease Information 2008; 21(4)
Start date: 15 Jan 2008
Reason for notification: reoccurrence of a listed disease
Date of previous occurrence: June 2006
Causal agent: highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, serotype H5N1
Outbreak 1 Rivne, Krasnogvardeisk, Crimean
Outbreak status: continuing (or date resolved not provided)
Epidemiological unit: farm
Species: birds
Susceptible: 25 000
Cases: 173
Deaths: 173
Destroyed: 15000
Slaughtered: 0
Affected population: laying hens in 2 poultry houses. 180 day old chickens were kept in the 1st poultry house and 390 day old chickens in the 2nd one. The youngest population showed 1st clinical signs of disease. Clinical signs were detected during epidemiological examination as follows: depression, dishevelled feathers, oedema, and cyanosis of head. The period from the 1st clinical signs till death lasts from 2 to 8 hours. During post-mortem examination, the following observations were made: enlarged liver, enlarged gall bladder and kidneys, catarrhal inflammation of duodenum, pinpoint haemorrhages into submucous membrane of ferriferous stomach.
Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive
No other notifications on illness or loss of poultry in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea have been registered up to date.

United Kingdom - Bird flu discovered in mute swan
10 Jan 2008
A total of 3 mute swans in Dorset have been found dead with the virulent H5N1 strain of bird flu. Efforts have begun to test other birds at Abbotsbury Swannery, a sanctuary located nine miles from Weymouth. The swans' carcasses were found following routine surveillance, a statement from Defra said. Culling of wild birds has been ruled out because experts fear this may disperse birds further.
Related Sources
11 Jan 2008 - ThisisDorset.net
12 Jan 2008 - The Times
15 Jan 2008 - OIE WAHID (World Animal Health Information Database) Disease Information 2008; 21(3)
16 Jan 2008 - United Kingdom – Avian Influenza- Swan
The Guardian [edited]
A 4th swan has tested positive for the deadly H5N1 strain of bird flu in Dorset, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) said today [16 Jan 2008]. Officials revealed on Thursday [9 Jan 2008] that 3 birds had tested positive for the virus at the Abbotsbury swannery during routine surveillance. A 3 km control zone and a 10 km monitoring area were set up around the swannery to try to stop the strain spreading. The outbreak poses little risk to humans but staff were being monitored for symptoms and were handed Tamiflu tablets as a precaution. Farmers and bird keepers have been ordered to isolate flocks from wild birds near the swannery. As yet, no disease has been found in domestic birds. The swannery, a tourist attraction close to Chesil beach, claims to be the only managed colony of mute swans in the world. It was established by Benedictine monks in the 11th century.

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